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Abstract
How are platforms built and how do they evolve? This
is a salient question in digital ecosystems, where the
competition has moved from traditional one-sided
business logics to multi-sided platforms. In this paper,
we explore how a digital platform evolves when the
organization of the multilayered platform architecture,
and related control points, is modified through
competitive moves. We also examine how a firm may
be able to manage the increased complexity of the
platform. We show that when technical and strategic
bottlenecks are solved, the platform owner can expand
control to strategically important layers of the platform
stack. The findings indicate that the complexity of the
platform increases through a series of competitive
moves. However, complexity can be managed by
increasing the standardization of the platform
interfaces, and by jockeying for a stronger position in
critical parts of the platform stack.

1. Introduction
The digitization of product platforms has spawned
services which radically change business models and
disrupt ecosystems. The very existence of specific
industries has been called into question. For example,
LG and Sharp recently launched TV models which
feature a software-based game console (client
software), and which connect a TV set equipped with a
control pad to a gaming platform in the cloud, thereby
encroaching on the game console industry. Recent
research has significantly increased our knowledge of
the organizational and business mechanisms that
underlie digital platform innovations (e.g. [1, 2, 3, 33]).
They have also shown that the competition results in
increased platform complexity (e.g. [4, 5]), and in new
competitive landscapes among and within platforms
(e.g. [6, 7, 8, 9]). However, we know little of how
digital platforms evolve over time, or of the
mechanisms that influence such growth – topics that
are highly important for platform theory [9, 10]. One
key question in understanding digital platform

Kalle Lyytinen
Case Western Reserve University
kalle.lyytinen@case.edu
evolution concerns which types of competitive moves1
constitute a successful evolutionary path for platform
growth, given the dynamics of the marketplace.
We also know little of how the design architecture
of the digital platform needs to evolve when new
competitive moves add, modify, or remove platform
features. During this dynamic, a firm typically seeks to
create a new market position by modifying elements in
one or several layers of the platform stack [3]. The firm
can also seek to act as a platform for platforms for
services located in other layers of the service stack, and
thereby create a new control point. Furthermore, as the
overall platform evolves, and as new services and
features are added, the number of participating actors
will increase, as well as the types of couplings between
the actors. This increases the overall complexity of the
platform stack and may challenge its effective
management. Matters are further complicated by the
fact that different actors can now gain access to
different control points of the architecture, located in
different layers of the platform [5].
Due to the swift changes in the configurations, the
control of the overall structure of the platform will
change as evolution occurs, especially when specific
technologies or services at a certain layer become
technical or business-related bottlenecks [11]. These
dynamics increase the complexity of the platform, in
terms of how the services can be orchestrated and
managed. Nevertheless, we currently know little of
how overall digital platform management unfolds, due
to the fact that studies up to now have primarily
investigated the phenomenon statically, over brief time
periods [7, 9, 12]. Nor does the extant literature
address how the digital platform is built from scratch
by a nascent firm, or how the firm then engages in a
specific series of competitive moves over time. There
are several possibilities to engage in such moves at any
given time point, as afforded by the layered
architecture. The need is thus to discover specific rules
that govern the selection of appropriate moves, given
the history that applies, and the specific circumstances.
One way to decipher such moves is to track
The aim of a competitive move is to improve, reposition, or
defend a firm’s position in the market.
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competitive moves longitudinally within a platform,
differentiating moves that center on different layers,
and analyzing how such moves relate to the overall
logics of the digital platform growth.
Our study aimed to address these gaps in current
understandings of platform theory. In particular, we
were interested in the kinds of competitive moves that
might lead to a software product being “platformized”
within chosen markets. Thus, we examined (1) how a
digital platform owner was able to reconfigure the
platform stack over time by engaging in a specific
sequence of competitive moves, (2) to what extent
these competitive moves changed elements at different
layers of the stack and thereby changed the dynamics
of control over the stack, and (3) how such moves may
potentially influence platform complexity, including
how such complexity can be managed through
garnering new firm-level capabilities. In addressing
these questions, our study responded to recent calls to
investigate factors that may influence a firm’s strategic
choices in situations of digitally-enabled competition
[3], and the dynamics of platform evolution [9, 10, 13].
Our study also sought to shed light on the origins of
increasing platform complexity [1, 4, 5]. With these
considerations in view, we conducted a longitudinal
case study, covering more than a decade, to explore the
evolution and competitive logics associated with a
digital platform in the gaming industry.

2. Conceptual development
A platform forms a competitive foundation upon
which other firms can develop content, innovate with
complementary technologies, and create new services
[13]. In this paper, we focus on digital platforms, with
such a platform defined as “the extensible codebase of
a software-based system that provides core
functionality shared by the modules that interoperate
with it and the interfaces through which they
interoperate” [10, p. 672]. Such platforms are typically
organized as a loosely coupled layered modular
architecture. This organization enables firms to
innovate simultaneously at different layers of the
architecture, and to compete on related services [3].
Most digital platforms operate on two-sided markets;
hence, content providers and end-users interact through
the platform and thereby enjoy direct and indirect
network effects [6, 9]. In such markets, a key challenge
is how firms can design, build, control, and sustain the
competitiveness of the platform by orchestrating an
ecosystem that will invite participation from both sides
of the platform [3]. Typically, this happens by
positioning the platform through aggressive, novel, and
swift competitive moves, aiming to achieve a dominant
position on either or both sides of the market.

2.1. Evolution of the platform stack
Digital platforms change by effecting changes at
some level of a multilayered platform stack, including
the relationships between the stack layers. By tracing
such changes, we can understand how the platform is
organized, and the essential couplings between
different layers [3, 9]. Such connections also reveal
how the platform stack is connected to a variety of
actors in the overall ecosystem. We can conceptualize
the platform stack as a loosely coupled layered
modular architecture with four layers, comprising (i) a
device, (ii) a network, (ii) a service, and (iv) content.
The device layer refers to physical devices that can be
used to connect and interact with the platform (e.g. a
specific TV set, mobile phone, etc.). The network layer
refers to the network protocols that the platform uses to
communicate over the network to different devices.
The service layer relates to the functionality of the
applications that enable customers to use the contentrelated services. The content layer includes the content
that customers interact with, e.g. new videos (cf. [3]).
By studying the platform stack as a layered
modular architecture, we can recognize the loosely
coupled nature of the digital platform. Loose coupling
implies that the platform interacts with an open-ended
range of devices, networks, services, and content [3].
Accordingly, the designers of the components of a
layer in the layered modular architecture cannot fully
predict how the designed component will be used in
the future (in the context of a new service), or how it
might impact on other layers [3]. Having a layered
modular architecture allows innovations to occur
independently at any layer. This also means that a
change in one layer will propagate non-linear changes
in other layers, creating opportunities or restrictions for
the platform owner.
There are at least three distinct groups of actors that
participate in a digital platform ecosystem organized
around layered platform architecture. These are the
platform owners, the content providers, and the endusers [9]. Each actor has unique needs and motivations
to participate within the different layers of the platform
stack. The actors may control different layers of the
platform stack, in part or as a whole. The control can
be based on either strategic or technical “bottlenecks”
[11, 21]. In the event of technical bottlenecks, there
may at a certain layer be few or no alternative
technologies that a firm can use to bring the platformrelated service to the market (cf. [11]). Strategic
bottlenecks refer to actions whereby a firm can prevent
or limit other actors’ access to their platform [11].
Commonly, platform owners will try to attract more
content providers for their platform to make it more
attractive to platform users [6, 9]. To facilitate such
content acquisition, the platform owner can provide
content providers with access and resources that will
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facilitate the development of attractive services for the
platform [9, 12]. These resources can be application
programming
interfaces
(APIs)
or
software
development kits (SDKs) that third-party developers
can use to bring their innovations more easily to the
platform [22].
Because several competing platforms are available
on specific layers, platform owners typically seek to
“multihome” their services [23, 24]. In multihoming, a
content provider may, for example, use more than one
channel to offer content to end-users, or end-users can
use more than one device or network to gain access to
the content [9]. In the context of this study, we are
interested in “platform multihoming.” In this case, a
platform owner seeks to multihome the platform across
different channels on the network layer, or across
multiple devices in the device layer, so that both
service providers and end-users can enjoy more ways
to gain access to the service. The approach in our study
differed from previous studies on multihoming, in that
the latter have primarily focused on multihoming
problems from the viewpoint of either the content
provider or the end-user (see e.g. [9, 23, 24]).

2.2. Competitive moves
Digital platform evolution consists of a sequence of
competitive moves organized at different levels of the
multi-layered platform stack. Such competitive moves
can be conceptualized as a firm’s distinct and discrete
actions in the market place [14], with “action” defined
as “a specific and detectable market move” initiated by
a firm. The moves can either be proactive or reactive.
Proactive moves seek to improve or re-position the
firm’s position in the market, while reactive moves are
generated as a response by the firm to defend its
position in the market [14]. These moves are informed
by a rationale offered by the managers [14], and such a
rationale can be expressed in a set of rules anchored in
specific cause-and-effect models that are anticipated
while engaging in the move [15, 16]. Overall, a firm’s
strategy can be conceptualized as an emergent pattern
of moves and related rationales [14, 15, 16]. In our
case, such moves were related to a series of
interactions between a platform and its environment.
By investigating these moves and related rationales, it
was possible to observe and understand the logics of
digital platform evolution [10].
Through competitive moves, the firm’s platform
innovation typically evolves toward a more complex
structure. One reason for this is that digital platforms
(due to their loosely coupled and networked nature)
constitute highly complex structures over time [4, 5].
Moreover, due to the flexibility of the software, such
structures can develop and grow in unpredictable ways
[9]. One indication of growing complexity is the
exponential growth of actors associated with either side

of the platform market [8]. Another indication is the
growth of new couplings, with different actors on
different sides of the platform in different layers.
Finally, the diversity and type of connections within
the stack also signals increasing complexity (cf. [17]).
As the complexity grows, the platform becomes
technologically more sophisticated, in connecting to a
larger number of components. It will tend to include a
larger number of interfaces whereby the size of the
codebase grows exponentially. These all increase the
internal and external complexity of the platform, and
make the platform more challenging to manage and
evolve.
When a firm starts to evolve a platform, the
strategic goals of the platform may change constantly
as new technologies emerge, as market needs shift, and
as consumer or technology preferences change (cf. [8,
18]. To better understand the competitive logic of
platform creation, one can adopt some ideas from
complexity theory [19], especially regarding nonlinear
outcomes based on rapid transitions and coevolutionary processes, and the ways in which order
emerges from such processes [18, 20] In the present
study, we were especially interested in how a digital
platform owner can create order by stabilizing and
destabilizing the platform stack in non-linear ways,
through a sequence of competitive moves.

3. Research method
To address our research questions, we conducted a
longitudinal, exploratory case study. We chose this
method because it made it possible to cater for the
empirically rich and detailed data of a complex and
understudied phenomenon [25, 26]. The longitudinal
case study method also facilitated an examination of
long-term changes in the case firm’s competitive
landscape. We selected the case firm for this study
using three criteria: (i) the firm develops digital
platform for multi-sided markets, (ii) the firm and the
platform have a long history, making it possible to
observe the competitive moves over an extended
stretch of time, and (iii) the firm is relatively small,
making it easier to observe actions taken in the
development process within the market [27].

3.1. The case firm
The case firm, G-cluster, has developed a digital
platform for cloud gaming services. The platform
allows computer and console games to be played
across various devices. The platform is operated by the
game servers that transmit games as (i) an MPEG
stream to client devices over a network operator’s
landline or high-speed wireless network, or (ii) overthe-top (OTT), as a stand-alone game service. The
client devices receive the stream, display the game, and
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transmit the users’ commands back to the game server
operating the game. G-cluster was founded in Finland
in 2000. Currently, G-cluster has its headquarters in
Japan, and its R&D activities in Finland.

3.2. Data collection
We collected several types of empirical material
covering the entire history of the case firm, from 2000
to 2015. The most important source was interviews
with the managers of the firm. These took place
between 2005 and 2016. In total we conducted 28
interviews, each lasting around 45–90 minutes.
Because the case firm is relatively small, interviews
with the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) formed the
main source of information. However, to improve the
validity of the study, to avoid personal bias, to
triangulate, and to gain the most relevant knowledge
for each topic covered [29], we interviewed eight
additional employees in the firm. To reduce recall bias,
we also interviewed the CEO and four employees more
than once. The interviewees were selected on the basis
of their knowledge related to various phases of the
platform evolution and market development.
Furthermore, we conducted interviews with three
employees of the case firm's main partner in Japan to
acquire a more comprehensive understanding of the
evolution of the platform.
All the interviews began with background
information on the interviewee, including the
interviewee’s role in the firm, and involvement in
platform development. The first interviews focused on
the history of the firm with respect to the creation of
the platform and its initial development. Thereafter,
each follow-up interview focused on platform and
business development since the previous interview. All
the interviews were recorded and transcribed verbatim.
This resulted in 305 single-spaced pages of interview
data. To avoid retrospective bias [29], we collected
around 180 pages touching on several types of
secondary data. These covered the whole history of the
firm, the aim being to validate the interview data
whenever possible.

3.3. Data analysis
Inductive techniques were applied to analyze the
qualitative data acquired from the case firm [27, 28,
30]. We first carried out data reduction [28] by
synthesizing the complete transcripts from the
interviews and secondary data [27] into a baseline
document covering the history of the firm. Here we
followed Pettigrew [31], who recommends arranging
incoherent aspects of context evolution in
chronological order, the aim being to facilitate
understanding of the causal links between critical
events.

After the data reduction, we coded the interview
data using open thematic content analysis [32]. As a
first step, we traced the emerging stages in the platform
evolution, using the framework for layered modular
architecture devised by Yoo et al. [3] as a template for
coding. On the basis of the framework, we coded for
all the changes in the different layers of the stack for
each competitive move. We next organized these
changes into a sequence of “platform stacks” arranged
in chronological order, seeking thus to synthesize the
entire history of platform configurations. Thereafter,
we attempted to discover and identify the motivations
for the competitive moves, with reference to the case
history. Here our approach was similar to that of
Woodard et al. [2]. In applying this method, a move
was conceptualized as a logical grouping of sequential
changes in the platform stack.

4. Findings
4.1. Competitive moves and changes in the
platform stack
Figure 1 gives an overview of the changes in the
platform stack, depicting the relevant actors at each
layer and the technology/service provided at each
stage. The colored boxes illustrate changes associated
with each move when new technology, or a new
service, was added to some layer. Table 1 synthesizes
each competitive move and its scope within the
platform stack; it also gives a brief description of the
success of the move, and initial reasons behind the
competitive move. By reviewing changes in the
platform stack we were able to trace how the evolution
of the platform and related stack configurations
impacted on the growth of the multisided market.
4.1.1. Platform stack #1. The first two competitive
moves were associated with initial development and
experimentation pertaining to the digital platform for
true commercial use. At its inception, G-cluster
focused on finding a device that was “right” in terms of
bringing to the market a general, mobile gaming
service. Accordingly, the first platform stack,
configured in 2000–2001, was created by two
consecutive competitive moves. The first competitive
move was the launching of the gaming service for 3G
networks and the introduction of client software for 3G
mobile phones. However, at this point there were no
operational and robust 3G networks available; hence
the market penetration of the 3G technologies proved
to be much slower than initially predicted. This meant
that the first move failed because of the technical
limitations of the network layer.
As their second competitive move, G-cluster
piloted a service using a server that was connected to
PDAs over the Wi-Fi network. The pilot worked and
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they were able to show the value of the platform to
both sides of the market (value proposition). Though
the pilot was successful, the development of the
supporting infrastructure (3G networks and 3G mobile
phones) and markets was much slower than had been
initially estimated. In addition, 3G networks proved
unreliable for handling the real-time bit-stream without
latency. Hence, G-cluster fairly quickly abandoned the
idea of 3G networks, moving instead to offering games
on fixed networks.
4.1.2. Platform stack #2. The third competitive move
was based on G-cluster’s realization that it had to
configure its platform stack for fixed networks. The
reconfiguration adopted in 2002 was significant,
including as it did changes to the platform stack at the
device, network, and content layers. The aim was to
home the gaming service into the IPTV markets that
were emerging as a new way to deliver digital content
to televisions using set-top boxes. The solution was
successfully implemented on a pilot basis. However,
the IPTV operator headed into financial problems, and
was unable to continue cooperation with G-cluster.
4.1.3. Platform stack #3. The third platform stack
configuration, in 2003–2004, encompassed three
competitive moves. The platform, with its capabilities
to deliver real-time game content between terminal
devices and a server, attracted increasing interest in the
marketplace. As a result, G-cluster was acquired by a
Japanese firm, Broadmedia (competitive move #4). At
the time, Broadmedia was a part of a large Japanese
telecom corporation (SoftBank) that owned Japan’s
largest ADSL network. The firm was actively
developing IPTV services, including video-on-demand
services, within Japan. This move helped in gaining
access to the Japanese markets and in reaching towards
an existing customer base. In addition, it facilitated the
acquisition of new and more advanced content from
game publishers at the content layer.
Though G-cluster had its platform configured for
IPTV providers, the integration of the client software
to the set-up boxes used for IPTV services proved to be
more difficult than expected (competitive move #5).
The difficulties were related again to the immaturity of
IPTV services. The corporation had successfully
launched its video-on-demand services, but it did not
want to risk this service by integrating it with a new
service offered by G-cluster. In addition, only a limited
proportion of consumers used IPTV services when the
technology was made available. Altogether,
commercialization of the platform was unsuccessful at
this stage, because of the immaturity of the relevant
network infrastructures, markets, and supporting
ecosystems. Because the commercialization of the
service to IPTV networks failed, G-cluster configured
the platform stack for existing Internet technology as

their next competitive move, #6. Device and network
layers were reconfigured for PC and Mac computers,
and at the service layer, client software was developed
for PC and Mac. In practice, players downloaded client
software for their computers from the Yahoo BB Japan
website. Thereafter, they were able to play casual
games over the broadband connection. Altogether, the
third platform stack reconfiguration made it possible to
commercialize the service.
4.1.4. Platform stack #4. The fourth platform
reconfiguration made it possible to expand the device
layer to set-top boxes via IPTV operators. Though the
previous competitive move had made it possible to
commercialize the service, the PC and Mac markets
proved unprofitable, because of intense competition
from the traditional computer game market. Hence, to
expand the market potential for the platform, the
company actively searched for potential IPTV
providers, having already configured client software
for set-top boxes. Accordingly, in 2005 G-cluster got
its first IPTV customer, the Cyprus telecommunication
Authority (CYTA). This competitive move, #7,
enabled the company to expand tits device portfolio
from PC and Mac users to IPTV users, and to
“multihome” its gaming service.
4.1.5. Platform stack #5. In 2008, as its next
competitive move, #8, G-cluster started to configure its
platform stack for cable TV networks in the USA.
Cable TV operators have traditionally had a strong
position in the USA market, and the market commands
a huge customer base. The strong position of the cable
TV operators in the market meant that the number of
IPTV providers (through the ADSL network) was
small. For these reasons, G-cluster began to configure
its platform and client software on Data Over Cable
Service Interface Specification (DOCSIS) networks,
and on related DOCSIS set-top boxes. However, the
configuration proved to be difficult to implement,
because in most cases, the return channel from the endusers to the server running the game was too slow. As
a result, G-cluster was not able to commercialize its
service in the DOCSIS network.
4.1.6. Platform stack #6. The next platform stack
configuration, resulted from two competitive moves.
Earlier competitive moves had brought reliability to the
platform service and demonstrated proofs of the
concepts. This enabled the company to start
negotiating with large telecom operators who could
offer similar gaming services on their networks.
Competitive move #9 was related to the launch of the
service in France. G-cluster started to cooperate with a
French telecommunication company (SFR), and in
2010 jointly commercialized the service in France
through
SFR’s
IPTV
network.
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Figure 1. Platform stack configurations
Platform stack

Competitive move

Platform stack #1
20002001

#1: Service for mobile phones to enable stream
mobile games over 3G network
#2: Client software for PDAs to pilot how the
service works
#3: Client software for set-top boxes

Platform stack #2
2002

Outcome of the competitive
move
#1: Unsuccessful
(Technical bottleneck)
#2: Successful

Reason for the competitive move

#3: Unsuccessful (Technical
bottleneck)

#3: Market entry

#4: Successful
#5: Unsuccessful (Technical
bottleneck)
#6: Successful
#7: Successful

#4: Market entry
#5: Market entry
#6: Market expansion/Value proposition

#1: Market entry
#2: Value proposition

Platform stack #3
2003-2004

#4: Acquisition by Broadmedia
#5: Client software for set-top boxes
#6: Client software for PC and Mac

Platform stack #4
2005-2007

#7: Client software for set-top boxes

Platform stack #5
2008-2009

#8: Client software for cable TV set-top boxes

#8: Unsuccessful (Technical
bottleneck)

#8: Market expansion

Platform stack #6
2010-2012

#9: Platform commercialized by a reliable partner
#10: SDK for game publishers

#9: Successful
#10: Successful

#9: Market expansion/Value proposition
#10: Value proposition

Platform stack #7
2013

#11: Development of cloud gaming console

#11: Successful

#11: Market expansion/Value proposition

Platform stack #8
2014-2015

#12: Client software for TVs
#13: CLIK for game developers
#14: Client software for 4G mobile phones.
#15: Exclusive game content for the platform
#16: Client software for cable TV set-top boxes

#12: Successful
#13: Successful
#14: Successful
#15: Successful
#16: Successful

#12: Market expansion/Value proposition
#13: Value proposition
#14: Market expansion/Value proposition
#15: Value proposition
#16: Market expansion/Value proposition

#7: Market expansion/ Value proposition

Table 1. Competitive moves related to each platform stack configuration
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This increased the credibility of the service
with other telecom operators. Following its successful
launch of the service, in 2012, G-cluster gained its next
content delivery contract with Orange, also for the
French market. The increased size of the market helped
it to negotiate and acquire advanced and recent content
from game publishers. The service started to attract
increased attention among well-known game
publishers, such as Disney, Warner Brothers, and
Electronic Arts, all of which started to offer content on
the platform. These contracts enabled the company to
expand the content layer from casual games to the
latest high-end games.
In 2010, G-cluster launched its own SDK for game
publishers, as competitive move #10. The SDK
facilitated the porting of games to the platform. Now
the game developers were able to write their games
directly to G-cluster's platform.
Altogether, this platform stack reconfiguration
introduced important changes, enabling initial
stabilization of G-cluster’s position in the market. In
the first place, it decreased complexity, as the service
was now provided purely via an IPTV operator that
controlled the device and network layers. Secondly, it
permitted duplication of the service for other IPTV
providers, without increasing the service complexity.
Thirdly, it attracted the attention of content providers;
this helped in expanding the actors within the content
layer, and in attracting potential IPTV partners.
4.1.7. Platform stack #7. Although the business
through the IPTV operators was steadily growing, and
although G-cluster received new content for its
platform from several well-known game publishers, the
delivery of the game content was limited to the IPTV
operators. This made the total market coverage for the
games relatively small. Furthermore, G-cluster realized
that the negotiation processes for configuring client
software for the operators’ set-top boxes was slow and
time consuming. These difficulties led to competitive
move #11. The aim was to expand the market and
avoid the difficulties associated with IPTV operators,
by-passing the strategic bottleneck that the latter
created. This was accomplished by developing a cloudbased game console. In 2013, G-cluster launched a
cloud game console, called the “G-cluster gaming
machine” in Japan, and later in the USA. The console
was a small device with HDMI/USB adapters that
enabled end-users to gain access to G-cluster’s cloud
game server. As the cloud console used the OTT
network, the service was available through any telecom
operator’s broadband network. The cloud-based
gaming console thus made it possible to expand market
control at the device layer, i.e. beyond IPTV operators.
4.1.8. Platform stack #8. In 2013 G-cluster decided to
integrate its client software directly into (digital) TVs

as their next competitive move (#12). This further
expanded multihoming at the device layer. Bringing
the cloud game console to the market also convinced
TV manufacturers that the service would work over an
OTT network. In late 2013, G-cluster signed a contract
with two TV manufacturers (Sharp and LG), both of
which integrated G-cluster’s client software for their
initial TV setup. This was brought to the Japanese
market in 2014.
Because of the increased number of content
delivery channels, G-cluster needed more content for
their service. To speed up the acquisition and
integration of the gaming content for its platform, Gcluster developed a Codeless Integration Kit (CLIK) as
its competitive move #13. CLIK demonstrated to game
publishers how their games would work in the cloud
environment, reduce the need for porting, and provide
a quicker way to acquire content for the platform.
In late 2014, G-cluster finally started to develop the
platform toward its original target device, i.e. mobile
phones (competitive move #14). For this purpose, the
company established cooperation with Square Enix,
which develops the role-play series Final Fantasy.
Games that require about 60 gigabytes of memory to
install, and which cannot be run on mobile devices, can
now be played on mobile devices over 4G or Wi-Fi as
a cloud service. G-cluster has configured the client
software for the mobile games, and the client has been
made available in Japan through Apple’s App Store
and Google’s Play store.
In 2014 G-cluster expanded its activities to the
content layer by starting to develop exclusive content
for its platform, seeking thus to attract more customers
(competitive move #15). The games in question
included features that permitted, for example, offline
gaming using a mobile phone, and thereafter
transference of the game figure from the mobile phone
to TV. Continuation was possible by playing the game
in the cloud environment, with more advanced
graphics and features. In 2015, the company also
expanded its market by developing client software for
a Japanese cable TV provider J:COM (competitive
move #16). The development of cable TV networks
made it possible to run the service over the cable
network.

4.2.
Competitive
moves
and
the
reconfiguration of the platform stack over time
As can be observed from Figure 1, most of the
platform stack reconfigurations prior to 2010 took
place at the network and device layers, whereas later
reconfigurations increasingly involved changes at the
service and content layers. This marks a shift from
removing technical bottlenecks and related control
points towards creating new value propositions in
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growing markets, and either creating or overcoming
strategic bottlenecks. In specific terms, the first
competitive moves were related to addressing an initial
homing problem, i.e. finding a suitable network/device
combination that would be sufficient to bring the
service to the market. Competitive moves #1–#5
focused mainly on overcoming technical bottlenecks
related to low bandwidth at the network layer, and to
the unreliable set-top box technology at the device
layer. Platform stack reconfiguration #3 made it
possible to commercialize the service through PCs and
Macs, and reconfiguration #4 – operating at the
network and device layers – expanded the service for
IPTV. However, technical bottlenecks were also
present at platform stack reconfiguration #5, when Gcluster tried to enter IPTV markets through cable-TV
operators. Here one can see how the instability of the
technologies at the network and device layers hindered
commercialization of the service in the early stages of
platform evolution. Finally, competitive move #9 led to
platform stack reconfiguration #6. This made it
possible to commercialize the service through a
credible and well-known IPTV provider.
After platform stack reconfiguration #6, the
competitive moves focused on market expansion and
on creating novel value propositions on either side of
the market. This included the introduction of new
network and device combinations, managed via the
same cloud-based solution. Considered in detail,
market expansion was motivated by competitive moves
#11, #12, and #16, within a device layer that was
aimed to increase the multihoming of the platform via
several devices. This increased the value of the
platform to the content providers and end-users.
Competitive moves #10 and #13-#15 (which were
related to value propositions) focused mainly on the
service and content layers. They facilitated new and
more advanced content acquisition via SDK and CLIK
at the service layer.

4.3. The dynamics of the control over different
layers of the platform stack
For the most part, G-cluster operated within and
sought to control the service layer. However, the actors
in the network layer controlled access to the device
layer during all of platform stack reconfigurations #1–
#6. These actors created both technical and strategic
bottlenecks, since they controlled access and
constrained possibilities to multihome the service at the
device layer. Initially, technical bottlenecks played a
major role, leading to constant platform stack
reconfigurations in attempts to find a suitable
combination at the network and device layers, with a
view to creating a feasible service. Thereafter, the

control points moved toward strategic control, within
which IPTV providers controlled access to the devices
and to end-users. Competitive move #11 and platform
reconfiguration #7 made it possible to bypass this
control point. The competitive moves here created
autonomy through use of the company’s own device (a
cloud gaming console); this provided direct access to
the device layer via an operator-independent OTT
model. After competitive move #11, G-cluster was in
part able to take control of the device layer.
On the other side of the platform, the content
providers exercised strong control over the content
provided by the platform. During platform stack
reconfigurations #1–#5, the content providers were
cautious about releasing content. This was mainly
because of the undeveloped device and network
technologies, plus relatively small market coverage.
However, competitive move #9 opened up a larger
market through a well-established IPTV provider,
increasing the content provider’s willingness to
provide content. In addition, G-cluster expanded its
activities towards the content layer when it started to
develop exclusive content for its service (competitive
move #15).
4.4. Managing increasing
competitive moves

complexity

through

The complexity of the platform increased through
competitive moves #1–#8, as the platform had to be
individually adjusted to different networks and devices.
These increased the couplings between layers and
related actors. As the complexity of the platform
increased, it became increasingly difficult to manage
the platform adequately. To solve the problem, Gcluster implemented competitive move #9. This
reconfigured the platform stack in such a way that its
complexity decreased substantially. In this stack
configuration, G-cluster created a new order by
simplifying its network and device layers to such an
extent that the company operated through only one
reliable actor in the market. Moreover, the complexity
could now be managed at the technical level through
the increased technical maturity of the platform
(competitive move #9). It was now possible to
standardize interfaces with (i) the invoicing system, (ii)
terminal devices, and (iii) channel menu selection.
There was now a situation involving fewer actors and
greater standardization of the interfaces.
Platform complexity started to increase once again
after platform stack reconfiguration #6. This involved a
series of competitive moves: #11, #12, #14, and #16.
These moves increased the number of actors and
technologies involved at the network and device layers.
In addition, the number of content providers increased
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at the content layer. However, by this time, G-cluster
had built up its capabilities to manage the increased
complexity. The measures used included (i) creating a
platform with standardized interfaces, (ii) controlling
installations that had previously been coordinated
through third parties, (iii) harmonizing the licensing
model, and (iv) standardizing content acquisition via
SDK and CLIK.

5. Conclusions and discussion
This exploratory case study makes three notable
contributions to previous literature and theory
development in the context of digital platform
evolution. Thus, our findings reveal: (1) how a digital
platform evolves through competitive moves, (2) how
competitive moves change the dynamics of control of
the platform stack, and (3) how a platform owner can
manage the increasing complexity.
In the first place, the study illustrates how the
platform owner can reconfigure the platform stack [3]
over time by engaging in a sequence of competitive
moves. In other words, by studying a platform change
longitudinally, one can see how a nascent firm is able
to build up a platform from scratch through an
emergent pattern of competitive moves (cf. [14, 15,
16]), and further, how the platform evolves over the
period in question. The study contributes to
competitive dynamics theory [14] in the context of
digital platform evolution. The findings indicate that
the possibility to reconfigure the platform stack is
largely dependent on previous competitive moves, and
on the capability of overcoming technical and strategic
bottlenecks [cf. 11, 21]. This expands from competitive
dynamic literature (see Chen and Miller [14] for a
further review), which has ended to focus on the
market entry of new products or services in traditional
industries. In contrast, the present study shows how the
same service can be applied to create new markets and
value in multisided markets. Our conceptualization
indicates that initial moves aim to multihome the
platform and to remove technical bottlenecks.
Thereafter, competitive moves focus on service and
content layers, with the aim of creating value to endusers and content providers within a chosen niche. As
observed here, the advances of network and device
technologies may also largely dictate the rationality of
competitive moves.
Secondly, our findings contribute to an
understanding of how competitive moves change the
dynamics of control over the layers of the platform
stack. It can be concluded that within sequences of
competitive moves, technical bottlenecks arise; these
needs be solved at critical layers before a firm can
consider expanding its control over other strategically

important layers. In other words, by overcoming
technical bottlenecks [11], a firm creates value and
capabilities for subsequent moves aimed at expanding
control over the platform stack. The overcoming of
bottlenecks requires high scalability of the service to
new devices and networks. Increased control also
facilitates the outsourcing of value creation activities to
other actors within the platform stack, as the actors
become increasingly dependent on the platform owner.
In the present case, the platform owner initially
operated solely in the service layer. However, once
technical bottlenecks were solved, the platform owner
started to expand control over other strategically
important layers (device and content). The rationality
of expanding control was related to the need to
overcome the strategic bottlenecks set by IPTV
providers at the device and network layers, and to
create more differentiated value for end users.
Consequently, this increased the value of the platform
for both sides of the market (cf. [3, 22]). The findings
in this respect advance digital platform literature [1, 3,
5, 12] by demonstrating how a digital platform owner
may be able to shift control from one layer to other
layers.
Thirdly, we contribute to complexity theory [18,
19, 20] in the context of digital platform evolution, by
examining how competitive moves increase the
complexity associated with a platform, and how such
complexity could be managed. We indicate that
platform complexity increases during an evolutionary
process within which a firm overcomes technical or
strategic bottlenecks, and moves to new markets by
multihoming the platform. However, the complexity
can be managed through competitive moves that focus
on simplification, standardization, and control of the
platform stack. By reducing the complexity, a platform
owner can gain a more competitive position in the
market, through having better control over different
layers of the platform stack.
Taking a broader view, the findings extend
platform complexity research [4, 5] by demonstrating
the reasons for increased platform complexity, and
further, how the complexity can be managed through
specific competitive moves. In particular, the findings
indicate that the complexity of the platform increased
during successive competitive moves, as new
technologies emerged (cf. [18]), making it possible to
multihome the platform across different devices and
networks. In the present case, this increased the
number of actors and couplings, not just on both sides
of the platform [6, 8, 9], but also within different layers
of the stack, making the management of the platform
increasingly complex. This illustrates how a change at
one layer of the platform stack can impact on other
layers in the stack, thus demonstrating the nonlinear
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outcomes of rapid co-evolution that are common for
complex systems [18, 19]. All in all, it can be claimed
that the findings lead to a better understanding of how
firms may be able to manage and decrease platform
complexity.
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